Abstract -
INTRODUCTION
N ew York City adopted the fi rst local general sales tax in 1934 partly because of widespread dissatisfaction with real property taxes following the depression. City and county governments in 34 states increasingly turn to the sales tax, often to add diversity and stability to their revenue structure. The number of local governments with sales taxes has grown from just under 3,000 in the early 1970s to over 9,000 today. General sales taxes have become the second largest local revenue source, accounting for approximately 12 percent of local tax revenue in 2002, a 20 percent increase over the previous decade.
At the same time, sales tax bases are shrinking, primarily due to growth in remote sales (Bruce and Fox, 2000) , technological changes, legislated exemptions, and changing purchasing patterns (Merriman and Skidmore, 2000) . 1 Sales tax bases as a percentage of personal income have declined nearly 27 percent, down from 53.2 percent in 1979 to 39.1 percent in 2003. Local governments must offset the shrinking base and corresponding revenue losses by raising the sales tax rate, exploiting other revenue sources, or reducing spending. Local government tax bases are particularly at risk because of the ease with which people can shop in other nearby jurisdictions or remotely.
In many places the sales tax has moved from simply adding diversity to state and local tax structures to becoming an integral component of local tax revenue, and this presents a set of unique compliance problems in the modern era when 1 See Fox (1988 Fox ( , 2003 for further discussion of these points.
dealing with remote sales. For example, the Streamlined Sales Tax Project (SSTP) is a national effort by states to harmonize the entire sales tax system by developing uniform defi nitions of the tax base, simplifying audit and administration procedures, and developing technologies that make compliance feasible for the thousands of remote vendors. Fifteen states have conformed to the SSTP and begun operating together. Offi cials in several other states, including Tennessee, Texas, and Washington, have delayed full adoption of the SSTP Agreement in part because of concerns that local governments will lose sales tax autonomy as states move toward uniform local structures with destination-based sourcing of the revenues.
Using data on local sales tax rates in Tennessee, we identify the economic and political forces that lead local governments to fully exploit sales tax options by raising local sales tax rates to a legal maximum, and we also examine how these forces have changed over time. The sales tax environment in Tennessee is interesting both because of the state's heavy reliance on the revenue source and the fact that eight states border Tennessee, all of which have lower overall sales tax rates.
2 In addition, Tennessee imposes a statewide limit on local sales tax rates that it periodically increases in discrete steps that apply uniformly to every county. Because of the state-mandated rate limit, rate increases are a natural but limited tool for addressing sales tax base erosion (Mikesell and Zorn, 1986; Ferris, 2000; Bruce and Fox, 2000) . However, counties that quickly raise their sales tax rates to the maximum-allowed rate have signaled a strong preference for the sales tax relative to their neighbors, many of whom never reach the maximum rate.
We employ a duration model to study the decision to increase the local rate to the maximum, during a span of time in which the average local option rate increased by 100 basis points from 1.3 percent to 2.3 percent. We further divide this time span into two shorter periods, characterized by different maximum local option sales tax rates. Our focus is on spells of time in years that a county remains below the maximum local option rate, where the end of a spell (or "failure" in duration model terms) occurs when the county reaches the maximum rate. Our results show that in the earlier time period, counties with larger sales tax bases were less likely to raise their sales tax rates to the maximum allowed by law. This was not found during the latter part of our study when a higher local maximum rate was allowed. For that period, counties with a lower property tax base or a larger share of Republican voters were more likely to raise their local sales tax rate to the state maximum.
This study contributes to the literature in a number of important ways. First, the paper provides an empirical contribution to the literature on the determinants of local government tax structure. The paper provides a setting where one can observe how state-driven tax policies may have an affect on local governments' tax rate decisions. In this particular case, we examine the factors that lead a county to adopt the maximum-allowed local option sales tax rate. Further, the paper adds to the limited empirical literature on vertical externalities at the state and local level in the U.S. as we consider the factors in separate time spans where state-level constraints differ. Finally, we use modern duration analysis methods, which allow us to examine the effects of a county's characteristics on the time it takes to reach the maximum rate. This method is preferred to other statistical techniques because it allows us to not only examine characteristics of counties that choose to move to the maximum, rate but also explore the timing of those decisions relative to other counties. Taken together, our research represents a contribution to the literatures on revenue determinants, tax competition, and responses to state-imposed revenue limitations. This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefl y discuss the relevant literature. The third section includes an explanation of Tennessee's sales and property tax structures. We then introduce a model for examining the role of economic and political factors and describe the data used. Following a discussion of the results, we conclude with a summary and suggestions for future research.
PRIOR RESEARCH
Tax rate decisions involve both political and economic considerations. Elected representatives must choose tax rates suffi cient to fund desired expenditures but competitive enough to keep the tax base from fl eeing. As a result, legislators must consider the tax options (e.g., sales or property taxes), taxable bases in their jurisdiction, and the tax rates necessary to raise the desired amount of revenue. Prior research has found that local option sales tax adoption is a function of expenditures, other revenue sources, neighbor's adoption and fi scal stress (Sjoquist and Wallace, 2003; Sjoquist, Smith, Wallace and Walker, 2005) . Seligman and Hou (2006) also fi nd some evidence that adoption of the local sales tax to substitute for the property tax can lead to slower revenue growth.
Prior research also shows that sales tax rate increases may refl ect a desire to increase spending, to reduce property taxes or to follow neighboring rateincreasing jurisdictions Luna, 2004; Case, 1993; Rork, 2003; Hill, 2005) . Substitution effects may be more prevalent at the local level since every county has a border, but the response to sales tax rate differences differ depending on the type of good being purchased (Cornia, Nelson and Walters, 2005) .
While this study does not directly test for vertical externalities, it does provide some evidence about how counties react when faced with changing state tax policies.
4 Empirical research on vertical externalities is limited and fi nds mixed results. For example, Besley and Rosen (1998) fi nd that states raise tobacco and gasoline tax rates in response to federal tax rate increases, and Esteller-More and Sole-Olle (2001) fi nd that states increase personal income and sales tax rates following an increase in federal income tax rates. However, others have also concluded that a tax interaction between the levels of government exists but fi nd an opposite sign on the interaction (Hayashi and Boadway, 2001; Goodspeed, 2000) .
Another important line of research examines how local governments respond to state-imposed tax and/or spending limits. At the state level, limits on local governments have been found to increase the state's role in combined state and local activity (Joyce and Mullins, 1991) . At the local level, Shadbegian (1999) found that governments increased other forms of revenue (e.g., user fees) when state law limited increases in local property taxes. Stine (1998) 5 Local sales taxes can be adopted and the rate can be changed when County Commissioners initiate a referendum and a majority of voters approve the proposal.
6 Local rate increases have been extremely common-the general sales tax comprised nearly 19 percent of total local tax revenue in Tennessee in 1972 (compared to a national average of 5.5 percent) and grew to 29 percent by 1985 before sliding to 22.5 percent today (as opposed to less than 12 percent for the U.S.). We revisit the post-1985 decline in our discussion of the results.
Tennessee legally constrains the local option sales tax rate. Until 1992, the rate was capped at one-half the state tax rate. In our first window (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) , the maximum local option rate was 2.25 (i.e., one-half the state rate of 4.5 percent), and in our second window (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) , the maximum rate was 2.75 percent.
7 Cities have the right to levy a local sales tax at a rate no larger than the difference between the allowed maximum and the county tax rate. Therefore, if a county reaches the maximum, a city within the county is precluded from levying a separate tax. 6 There is no variation in the process across counties. 7 Note, however, that an increase in the state rate from 5.5 percent to 6.0 percent in 1992 was not matched with an increase in the maximum allowable local option rate, which remains fi xed at 2.75 percent today. The formal link between the state rate and the maximum local option rate greatly reduces concerns over potential policy endogeneity. Given the importance of the sales tax to Tennessee state fi nances, actions to increase the state sales tax rate are likely to be driven primarily by state budget pressures rather than the number of counties already at the maximum local rate. 8 In 2005, only 21 cities had separate local option rates in addition to their county local rate. A portion of the county's sales tax revenue is allocated to the city in accordance with Tennessee state law. 9 Tennessee Statute §67-6-712.
rate by 1999. It should be noted that local governments are not constrained on the size of proposed local option sales tax rate increases. Indeed, single-year rate increases during our period of analysis ranged from 0.25 to 2.0, averaging about 0.8, among jurisdictions raising their local rates. As an additional note, local governments in Tennessee must defer to state authority on the sales tax base and, thus, have no power to change the set of taxable items.
The second major financing option available to Tennessee counties is the property tax. Similar to local option sales taxes, property tax rate increases are also passed by referendum. The effective property tax rate in Tennessee, however, depends on the county tax assessor's appraised value of the property and the level of the assessment for the type of property in question. Assessment ratios range from five percent to 55 percent, depending on whether the property is classified as utility, industrial, or residential property. For example, industrial real property is assessed at 40 percent of appraised value, while industrial personal property is assessed at 30 percent of appraised value.
In addition, the county assessor must certify the property tax rate following a general reappraisal of property. This certifi ed rate is the hypothetical tax rate that would raise the same amount in taxes that was raised in the previous year, but on the new tax base. Before legislators can approve a rate that is greater than the certifi ed rate, the local government must publicize its intentions.
MODEL AND VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
To examine the role of economic and political factors in the decision to raise sales tax rates to the maximum, we use a duration model. This approach allows us to assess the factors in the probability that a given county will increase its rate to the maximum given that it had not yet done RATES, 1975 -1999 Year 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1999 Rates so. Rather than treat each annual observation as separate, a duration approach links each county's history to form a spell of time spent below the maximum allowable local option rate. Thus, counties are included in our data until they reach the allowed maximum rate, or until the end of the study's time period, in which case they are right-censored. The timing dimension is important because counties face the decision of whether or not to raise their rates on a continuing basis (i.e., annual), and those sequential decisions should be linked in a statistical analysis that recognizes the timing issue. Treating counties that choose to reach the maximum tax rate differently from those that choose not to raise their rate enriches the empirical results in observing differences in county behavior.
As noted above, we perform separate analyses for two windows of time associated with different maximum local option rates: 1975 to 1984 and 1985 to 1999 . This approach recognizes the fact that each county's decisions in one maximum-rate regime might be statistically different than those in a later regime. In our duration analysis, we focus on determinants of the probability that a county votes to raise its local option sales tax rate to the state-allowed maximum. Empirically, our model considers factors in the conditional probability that the maximum rate is reached given that it has not previously been reached. Duration models are commonly used to study spells of time that might or might not have an observable ending, and that ending need not have positive or negative connotations (e.g., survival or death). Additional details on our estimation procedure are provided in the Appendix.
Factors that infl uence local sales tax rate decisions can be classifi ed into three groups. The fi rst group, which we call fi scal viability, should capture the in-jurisdiction economic appeal of changing the rate. The second-tax competition-reflects the infl uence of neighboring jurisdictions. Finally, the other county differences group includes variables that were important in earlier works. Each of these groups of covariates is discussed in greater detail below, and all covariates in the model are permitted to be time-varying.
Fiscal Viability
We identify six variables to represent a county's fi scal viability to control for a county-specifi c fi scal situation relative to the rest of the state. First, capacity measures a county's ability to raise revenue relative to other Tennessee counties. The capacity calculation begins with the product of the per-capita tax base for each county and the statewide average county tax rate for the revenue source (i.e., sales taxes and property taxes) for that year. 10 We then divide this value by the state average value across all counties to generate a capacity variable in index form. The capacity mean for each revenue source in each year is 100. For example, a county with a sales tax capacity index of 130 would generate 30 percent more sales tax revenue than average if all counties used the same tax rate.
Our use of tax capacity is based on the notion that a county's relative ability to generate revenue from a particular source (e.g., sales or property taxes) will play an important role in decisions about tax rates.
11 If, for example, a county's tax capacity is above 100, the county can raise the same tax revenue as a neighboring county with a lower rate. Therefore, for given spending levels, we expect that counties with higher tax capacities will be less likely to reach the maximum.
Of course, using the tax capacity measure carries with it some advantages and disadvantages. One important advantage is that county-specifi c erosion (or enhancement) in the base is emphasized. One disadvantage is that statewide base erosion/enhancement is not and cannot be captured. For example, when purchases of tax-exempt services grow throughout Tennessee and the sales tax base declines, the cross-sectional capacity scores will not refl ect the decline. Our approach does, however, capture the erosion effect for counties that experience it more quickly than the average county.
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Another index-tax effort-measures how intensively a county is taxing the available revenue base. We calculate property tax effort by dividing the county weighted average effective property tax rate, as reported in the Tennessee Statistical Abstract (1975 Abstract ( -1999 , by the simple state average for the same variable. Counties that show a high property tax effort have higher property tax rates than the average county in the state. 13 It is not clear whether counties with a higher-than-average property tax effort would be either more willing or less willing to raise sales tax rates. Both of these outcomes are feasible.
Per-capita expenditure levels and population growth (lagged) are included as proxies for fi scal need. If expenditures increase or the county incurs rapid population growth, local governments must raise taxes to fund the increase in demand for services (Wildasin, 1988) . The greater are a county's fi scal needs, the more likely it is that a county may raise its sales tax rates and reach the local option maximum.
Finally, the level of unemployment is included as a proxy for fi scal stress.
14 We predict that increases in expenditures, population growth, and the unemployment rate will be associated with shorter time periods to reach the maximum local option sales tax rate.
We recognize that property tax effort and per-capita expenditures are likely to be simultaneously determined with sales tax rates. Lacking suitable instrumental variable techniques within a duration modeling framework, we suppress these two variables from our initial models but include them in a set of alternative models in order to gauge the extent of bias from omitted variables or endogeneity.
Tax Competition
In a mobile economy, tax competition between jurisdictions is an important determinant of tax rates. Prior research has documented two primary, but somewhat contradictory, types of tax competition (Brueckner, 2003) . First, governments may engage in strategically setting tax rates in the presence of mobile individuals (Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986; Wilson, 1999; Mintz and Tulkens, 1986) . For example, a smaller county might lower rates in an attempt to draw shoppers from a larger neighbor (Kanbur and Keen, 1993) . A different view of the same environment is the yardstick competition models, where voters make comparisons of fi scal policies between jurisdictions and judge their own government by how the tax rate and tax burden compares to those of neighbors (Besley and Case, 1995; Bivand and Szymanski, 1997) .
12 Growth in out-commuting is one source of local base erosion (Hawkins and Murray, 2004) . With our approach, the capacity score will decline for a county experiencing new out-commuting patterns. 13 We should note that results were nearly identical when we replaced the property tax effort index with the actual (weighted average) property tax rate. 14 While we recognize that the county unemployment rate is an imperfect measure of fi scal stress, we retain it for its role as a general indicator of local economic health. We also recognize that reductions in federal and state grants may also be a source of fi scal stress. We have assumed that the relative impact is small and any impact should be accounted for in the time effect.
We choose two variables to proxy for the infl uence of tax competition. First, we include a variable for neighboring counties' sales tax rates. Prior empirical research has shown that commodity tax rates in the home jurisdiction respond positively to those in neighboring jurisdictions (Rork, 2003; Luna, 2004) . In other words, jurisdictions are more likely to raise rates if a neighbor has done so. We defi ne the neighbor variable as the average total sales tax rate of all contiguous counties, weighted by population.
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By using a weighted average, no single county is selected as the primary competitor, and all contiguous counties are permitted to have some infl uence. (Case, Hines and Rosen, 1989; Rork, 2003; Luna, 2004; Hill, 2005) . 16 Our approach is based on the assumption that larger neighboring counties are more likely to have an impact on the county's tax rate.
Because the total sales tax rate is lower in the eight states adjacent to Tennessee, counties on the state's border may face different competitive pressures than interior counties. Border counties may make a stronger effort to keep their local tax rates low to limit cross-border shopping arising from combined state and local sales tax differentials that are generally larger than those between interior counties. Prior research has shown that consumers respond to sales tax rate differentials between jurisdictions by crossing borders to shop, and the response is more elastic for those residing near borders (Fox, 1986; Walsh and Jones, 1988) . We include a dummy variable that takes a value of one for a border county and a value of zero for an interior county, with the expectation that counties along the state border will keep their rates lower. Thus, the neighboring-jurisdiction rate variable and the border dummy variable allow for both rate-increasing regional pressure and rate-decreasing state border pressure.
17

Other County Differences
A number of other county characteristics are likely to influence the decision to reach the maximum sales tax rate. We identify per-capita personal income, urbanization and the tendency to vote for one political party as potential infl uences. Because sales taxes are relatively more regressive than other taxes, counties with higher levels of personal income may prefer sales tax rate increases over property tax increases (Murphy and Izraeli, 1997) . In addition, urban counties may use their retail outlets to take advantage of non-resident shoppers and the ability to export sales taxes, also preferring sales tax rate increases.
18 Therefore, we include both per-capita personal income and whether a county was designated "urban."
We also expect the political environment to infl uence tax rates, as political environments regarding tastes for taxes are likely to differ across jurisdictions (Klassen and Shackelford, 1988; Omer and Shelley, 2004) . We include a percentagevoting-Republican variable (during the prior presidential election) in an attempt to capture one public choice aspect of sales tax rate increases (Murphy and Izraeli, 1997 ), but we have no expectation of the sign of its effect. 15 Since each county has between three and nine neighbors, including the tax rates of all neighboring jurisdictions in the model is not practical. 16 We test other defi nitions of neighbor as discussed below. 17 Our inclusion of tax rates in neighboring jurisdictions also serves as a partial consideration of the infl uence of spatial autocorrelation. We leave a more thorough investigation of spatial autocorrelation for future research as we are aware of no studies to date that have controlled for it in a survival-model context. 18 We defi ne urban according to the 2000 Census. Experimentation using the 1980 Census defi nition did not reveal signifi cant differences.
DATA
The model is estimated for 95 Tennessee counties spanning 1975 to 1999. Descriptive statistics for all of the variables are reported for the two time windows in Table 2 . 19 As described above, property tax effort is based on the weighted average effective property tax rate. These data are not available for 1975, 1976 and 1980, so we use forecasted values from separate stepwise autoregressive estimates for each county. In addition, data for the property tax base are missing for 1975 and 1976, and total expenditures are missing for 1997-1999. Here, the same process is used to forecast values in real, per-capita terms, which are then converted to nominal values.
Estimated Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard rates for the two time periods are shown in Table 3 . 20 The entries in Table 3 are estimates of the cumulative probability of reaching the maximum local option sales tax rate in each year of each of the two time periods. The estimates account for right censoring (i.e., the fact that some counties never reach the maximum local rate) in the underlying data and demonstrate that importance of analyzing tax rates in two separate windows. Based on the underlying data, we would have expected over two-thirds of the counties (64 of 95) to reach the maximum local rate during the fi rst window and slightly less than one-quarter (22 of 95) to reach the maximum in the second window.
Between 1975 and 1984, there were 75 tax rate increases spread among 63 of the counties in our analysis, and 48 of those counties reached the maximum sales tax rate. 21 Most of these counties chose to increase rates to the maximum immediately, with only eight counties passing at least two rate increases to eventually hit the maximum rate. From 1985 to 1999, 43 counties enacted 45 local option rate increases, with only 20 counties eventually reaching the maximum. Table 4 includes the results from four models for each window: a parsimonious model with only the three key exogenous tax variables (property tax capacity, sales tax capacity, and the weighted-average sales tax rate in neighboring counties), a more inclusive model that includes the exogenous control variables described above, and versions of both of the above that include the two potentially endogenous control variables (property tax effort and per-capita expenditures). Results are converted to time ratios for ease of interpretation. A statistically signifi cant time ratio that is greater than one indicates that a one-unit increase in that independent variable increases the amount of time spent below the maximum rate (i.e., slows down the movement toward the maximum rate). Similarly, a signifi cant time ratio that is less than one indicates that a one-unit increase in that independent variable reduces the amount of time the county is below the maximum tax rate (i.e., accelerates movement toward the maximum rate).
SURVIVAL ANALYSIS RESULTS
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Our most interesting finding is that different factors infl uenced the decision to maximize the local rate in the pre-1985 environment versus the later time span. The most striking contrast occurs in the 19 Tennessee state and local sales tax rate and base information and property tax data are obtained from the Tennessee Department of Revenue and the Comptroller's Offi ce, respectively. Rate information for the bordering states is obtained directly from the respective state governments. Demographic information is obtained from the Bureau of the Census, Bureau of Economic Analysis, and U.S. Department of Commerce. 20 The estimates in Table 3 are calculated using the method of Nelson (1972) and Aalen (1978) . See Cleves et al. (2004) for additional discussion of this method. 21 One additional county started the fi rst window at the maximum rate. 22 Recall that spells of time in our analysis are measured in years. -of-period (1984 or 1999) means for counties at the Maximum local option sales tax rate relative to counties below the maximum. "<" and ">" denote that the mean for counties at the maximum rate is signifi cantly below (<) or above (>) the mean in non-maximum counties.
role of tax capacity. Sales tax capacity is an important factor in reaching the rate maximum in the fi rst window but not in the second. Specifi cally, high sales tax capacity counties spent more time below the maximum sales tax rate between 1975 and 1984. With each one-percentage-point increase in the sales tax capacity index (e.g., from 100 to 101), the length of time spent below the maximum allowable rate increased by 0.6 to 1.8 percent, depending on the specifi cation.
The results also indicate a tradeoff between capacity and effort in the 1985-1999 window, but property tax capacity replaces sales tax capacity as the most important factor. Results for 1985 to 1999 indicate that counties with higher property tax capacity were less likely to choose the new maximum sales tax rate. Specifi cally, each one-unit increase in the property tax capacity index increased the length of time spent below the maximum rate by 1.3 to 1.5 percent, depending on the specifi cation. This is an interesting result because the second window includes the repeal in 1986 of the federal deductibility of sales tax payments. Because sales taxes were no longer deductible after the change was fully phased in and property taxes remained fully tax deductible, Tennessee residents who itemized should have preferred property taxes and their lower after-tax cost.
The shift from a focus on sales tax capacity to property tax capacity is consistent with the empirical data mentioned above. During the fi rst window when sales tax capacity was a signifi cant factor, the sales tax share of total local revenue grew from 18.8 percent in 1970 to 27.3 percent in 1984. During the second window when property tax capacity was signifi cant, the sales tax share remained relatively constant.
These findings highlight the role of state-level constraints in local rate decisions. For example, we fi nd no evidence of a neighbor effect in any of our models, while Sjoquist, Smith, Wallace and Walker (2005) fi nd that Georgia counties were more likely to adopt the state's local option sales tax when the neighbors had adopted one. However, the Georgia legislature's mandate that revenue from that tax must be used to roll back local property tax levies probably infl uences the estimated neighbor effect. Similarly, new school-funding equalization rules in Tennessee changed the influence of the property tax base on adopting the maximum local sales tax rate in the second window. Under the new rules, county commissioners should have been more inclined to favor the property tax as refl ected in our results.
Another possible explanation for different results in the second window is that the combination of state and local sales tax rate increases had pushed Tennessee rates up to among the highest in the country. In this environment, local policymakers might have been hesitant to make their county's rates even higher. As was previously mentioned, the eight states that border Tennessee all had lower overall sales tax rates.
Per-capita income is a second significant variable in the pre-1985 window. In this case, higher-income counties were more likely to reach the maximum local sales tax rate than lower-income counties, all else equal. This supports the idea that higher-income counties may be more likely to raise sales tax rates rather than property tax rates (a similar effect is found in Sjoquist, Smith, Wallace and Walker, 2005) . Upper-income taxpayers may tend to spend a smaller percentage of their income on sales taxable items (e.g., tangible goods) than lower-income individuals. Therefore, upper-income taxpayers will not bear the full economic incidence of sales tax rate increases. Interestingly, during 1985 Interestingly, during -1999 , counties with a higher share of Republican voters (as measured in the most recent prior Presidential election) were more likely to increase the local sales tax rate to the legal ceiling. This might represent the relative popularity of the sales tax with this set of constituents. If the Republican Party attracts a higher percentage of upper-income taxpayers than the Democratic Party, Republicans might prefer sales taxes because of their regressive incidence.
As mentioned, our results differ from the Sjoquist, Smith, Wallace and Walker (2005) paper in that we fi nd no clear evidence that tax rates in neighboring jurisdictions infl uence the decision to reach the sales tax rate maximum in a particular county.
23 Decisions in neighboring jurisdictions might be important, but the effect may be complicated (e.g., some neighbors may matter more than others) and escape scrutiny in this type of study.
It is worth noting that our main fi ndings in Table 4 are highly robust to the choice of specifi cation. The addition of a large set of covariates, including two that are potentially simultaneous with local sales tax rate decisions, does not have a dramatic impact on signs, magnitudes, or signifi cance levels of the other variables. This suggests a general absence of worrisome bias from omitted variables or endogeneity.
To assess the overall fi t of our baseline models, Figures 1 and 2 compare the estimated Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard rates from Table 3 with those estimated by our most inclusive multivariate models for 1975-1984 and 1985-1999, respectively . At fi rst glance, the trends in both series for both windows are similar and both follow the actual underlying data quite well. However, the apparent differences between the two series in each window reveal the importance of controlling for an array of covariates in investigating the process by which local governments move toward the maximum local option sales tax rate. This is especially true in the earlier time window, where the estimated cumulative hazard from the multivariate model more closely aligns with the actual data than does the Nelson-Aalen estimate.
Robustness Checks
We now discuss a series of alternative models, which are intended to further assess the robustness of our main fi ndings. Our fi rst robustness check considers the fact that, as previously discussed, local policymakers are required to publish the certifi ed property tax rate before a property tax increase is permitted. Consequently, certifi cation makes the public more conscious of the new revenue fl ow to the county. We control for this by including a dummy variable that takes a value of one in the year of certifi cation (real increase in property tax) and zero in all other years. This variable is never statistically signifi cant and none of the other results is affected by its inclusion or exclusion in the model. [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] We also explore the effect of separate dummies for counties on the state border (e.g., a dummy variable for Alabama, Kentucky, etc.). We fi nd that the inclusion of separate border state dummies has no effect on the results in the fi rst window. In the second window, however, both unemployment and personal income become statistically signifi cant, but no other results are affected.
We also experimented with alternative defi nitions of our neighbor variable in order to explore more broadly tax competition factors. Specifi cally, in fi ve separate models, we replaced the weighted average of the neighboring counties' sales tax rates with (1) the sales tax rate in the contiguous county with the lowest total sales tax rate, (2) the sales tax rate in the contiguous county with the lowest local option sales tax rate, (3) the number of contiguous counties at or above the Tennessee maximum rate, (4) the share of contiguous counties at or above the Tennessee maximum rate, and (5) the population-weighted share of contiguous counties at or above the Tennessee maximum rate. These alternative measures were not statistically signifi cant, and their inclusion did not impact the main fi ndings from our baseline model.
Our fi nal robustness check considers the fact that in 1992 the state sales tax rate increased from 5.5 percent to 6.0 percent and the discussed revenue sharing was implemented (the maximum allowable local option rate remained at 2.75 percent). We explore the impact of this change by including a dummy variable that takes a value of zero for years [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] and a value of one for 1991-1999. The results from this exercise are consistent with those presented in all other model variations.
CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTHER RESEARCH
In a state with heavy local sales tax reliance and a legal maximum on the sales tax rate, it is important to understand how political and economic forces combine to push some, but not all, localities to that maximum rate. In this paper, we use a hazard model to analyze the importance of a number of forces on the decision to max out the local option sales tax rate in Tennessee.
Our estimates indicate a tradeoff between capacity and effort-where higher-capacity jurisdictions were more likely to remain below the highest ratebut the capacity source varies across the two time spans analyzed here. In the earlier span, low sales tax capacity areas were more likely to reach the maximum rate. In the latter span, low property tax capacity areas had a greater tendency to choose that strategy. These results show how local tax policies changed over time. By the second window, only counties with low property tax capacity were willing to increase their sales tax rate to the maximum, consistent with the growing unpopularity of the property tax during that time period.
The capacity-source variation is consistent with a change in an important state-level constraint. After 1992, half of local sales tax receipts were retained by the state for education funding equalization purposes. This reduced the appeal of the sales tax in the later time period, except among counties with low property tax capacity. The paper also illustrates the impact of vertical externalities and how changes in state constraints affect local tax policy decisions.
We believe that panel length is an important decision in future research on rate changes, but additional work will be constrained in the short term by restrictions on data availability at the county level. It will also be interesting to learn whether the forces behind local option sales tax rate increases changed during the early years of electronic commerce and the development of the Streamlined Sales Tax Project. Successful streamlining is another way that state policy should infl uence local rates, but the direction is not clear. Streamlining should enhance the power of a local rate increase, but could also reduce the need for such rate increases by broadening the sales tax base.
Tennessee is unusual because it does not have a broad-based personal income tax and, therefore, necessarily relies very heavily on sales taxes for state revenues. Local option sales tax levies only add to one of the highest state-level sales tax rates in the country. Even though few U.S. local governments impose their own income taxes, the presence of a state income tax could affect local government tax structure choices for two reasons. An income tax could allow for lower overall state sales tax rates, giving local governments more freedom to increase their own sales tax rates without fear of losing more shoppers to lower taxed neighbors. On the other hand, an income tax could raise the overall tax burden for the state's taxpayers, making sales tax increases more politically diffi cult. Future empirical research on the effect of income taxes on local government tax structures is warranted.
Finally, while our model allows for separate rate pressure from neighbors (perhaps upward pressure) and from lower-rate jurisdictions in bordershopping environments, the effects are not signifi cant for separate time spans and under different specifi cations. Future work should explore the importance of spatial tax rate competition in more detail.
at least as long as some length t, which is given by the survival (or survivor) function:
The hazard rate λ(t) is the rate at which spells are completed immediately after t, given that they have lasted at least until t, and is related to the survival function as shown in equation [A2] . 
Empirically, hazard models express the hazard rate as a multiplicative function of some baseline hazard, λ 0 (t), and an exponential function of a set of covariates:
[A3] λ i (t) = λ 0 (t)exp(X i β ), where β represents the usual vector of coefficients. Estimation of this type of model involves making a decision about the functional form, if any, of the baseline hazard.
A direct extension of the proportional hazards specifi cation above is the accelerated failure time metric, which is the estimation method of choice in the current analysis. Begin by defi ning τ i as follows:
[A4] τ i = exp(-X i β )t i .
With some manipulation and rearranging, the log of t can then be conveniently expressed as a linear function of a set of relevant covariates:
[A5] ln(t i ) = X i β + ln(τ i ).
The natural log of τ i represents something of an error term in equation [A5] , the distribution of which determines the particular model in much the same way as the choice of functional form for the baseline hazard in the proportional hazards metric.
We chose the log-logistic distribution based on a comparison of values for the Akaike (1974) Information Criterion for various specifi cations. However, results were very similar for models with alternative distributions. 25 25 All survival-time models in this paper were estimated with the Stata (version 8) statistical software, which permits the researcher to consider a multitude of distributional assumptions as well as the usual controls for censored data. For additional information on these and other methods, interested readers should consult Cleves, Gould, and Gutierrez (2004) . The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is defi ned as -2lnL + 2(k + c), where lnL is the model's log-likelihood value, k is the number of model covariates and c is the number of model-specifi ed distributional parameters. AIC values for alternative models were 165.33 for exponential; 157.21 for Weibull; 158.26 for lognormal; and 156.00 for log-logistic.
